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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to address the allocation of development aid in relation to institutional 
quality of recipient countries by focusing on General Budget Support (GBS) – an aid 
modality associated with increased aid effectiveness and un-earmarked funds to 
recipient governments that display high institutional quality, but also with risks of moral 
hazard. The thesis departs from a theoretical framework based on previous research 
concerned with aid allocation and an on-going debate on aid effectiveness taking place 
within main donor organizations. On the one hand, aid effectiveness could theoretically 
be enhanced when aid is allocated in the form of un-earmarked funds, allowing for 
recipient governments to pursue their own policies and decrease the transaction costs 
often associated with aid. On the other hand, previous research indicates that donors 
may allocate aid based on strategic self-interest rather than altruism and the 
performance of recipients, and associates aid-inflows with risks in the form of moral 
hazard and misuse of funds. In relation to GBS, these two theoretical strands can be 
seen as somewhat conflicting. Is GBS only allocated to recipients with high institutional 
quality, as often claimed by donors? Similar to other sources cited in this thesis, a 
quantitative, cross-country approach is adopted. Departing from a dependent variable 
measuring GBS provided by the European Union within the framework of the Cotonou 
Agreement, OLS regressions are used. Three features of institutional quality are used as 
independent variables. The results obtained do not indicate that the institutional quality 
of recipients determines the allocation of GBS. 
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1. Introduction and purpose statement 
Every year, vast sums of development aid are provided by bilateral and multilateral donors to 
recipient countries and organizations. At the present, more than 150 billion US dollars per 
year is allocated, and the size of the yearly amounts has lately increased each year (OECD, 
2011a).
1
 Increased aid flows can be seen as necessary in order to eradicate poverty (Sachs et 
al., 2004). At the same time, aid can also be associated with a number of problems. Its effects 
have been questioned, and it has also been associated with risks in the form of moral hazard, 
corruption and distorted incentives for recipient governments to be accountable towards their 
citizens (Bräutigam, 2000; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Djankov et al., 2008; Goldsmith, 2001; 
Knack, 2001; Tavares, 2003). The impact of aid has been recognized to depend on the 
institutional quality – often discussed in terms of growth-fostering rules, control of corruption, 
level of democracy and regulatory quality – of recipient countries (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; 
Ear, 2007; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008; Wright, 2009). Following this line of thought, higher 
institutional quality of a recipient country is associated with higher probability for positive 
impact of aid. Conversely, aid allocated to recipients with weak institutional quality can be 
associated with higher risks in terms of corruption, which in turn may decrease the probability 
to achieve desired results. 
 
The notion of institutions in relation to aid has lately also gained increased attention by the 
donor community (OECD DAC, 2006a, 2012d). Outcome documents from a number of high 
level meetings, not least the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, have included 
commitments towards increased focus on recipient institutions in order to achieve improved 
results of aid resources spent (United Nations, 2003a, b; OECD DAC, 2005, 2008b, 2011, 
2012c). In line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, donors have recognized that 
aid channelled through recipients' own financial systems can enhance aid effectiveness – 
meaning “ensuring that development resources have the greatest impact on development” 
(OECD DAC 2012b) – when allocating development aid. This is said to allow for recipient 
governments to pursue their own policies and thereby increase their capacity (OECD DAC, 
2006a).  This notion is central for an aid modality called General Budget Support – un-
earmarked financial resources provided directly to a recipient's national treasury (OECD 
DAC, 2006c). Theoretically, the provision of un-earmarked financial resources is said to 
                                                        
1
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reduce donor-driven administration costs as well as improve the capacity of recipient 
governments to formulate and fulfil their own strategies for poverty reduction. Donors stress 
that General Budget Support is to be provided to “good performers” – recipients with high 
institutional quality – in order to ensure a positive impact and reduce the risks of misuse of 
funds provided (Koeberle & Stavreski, 2006; Gunning, 2006). This is well in line with the 
notion that aid should be allocated to recipients with high institutional quality. However, no 
fixed eligibility-criteria for allocation of General Budget Support exist. Donors motivate this 
by stressing that General Budget Support sometimes also can improve the institutions of a 
“poor performer” (OECD DAC, 2006e). 
 
The claim to allocate General Budget Support to “good performers” in combination with the 
lack of fixed eligibility criteria can be seen as interesting in relation to the previous research 
that indicate that donors may allocate aid based on factors such as strategic interests and 
historical relations with recipient countries rather than poverty alleviation (Alesina & Dollar, 
2000; Collier & Dollar, 2002; Neumayer, 2003; Easterly and Pfutze, 2008; Schraeder et al., 
1998). How is General Budget Support allocated?  
 
Central to the problem formulation of this thesis is thus the lack of clear allocation criteria of 
General Budget Support combined with the potential risks of misuse of aid resources and the 
previous research indicating that donors may allocate aid first and foremost based on their 
own strategic priorities.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is therefore to examine to what extent donors actually practise what 
they preach and allocate General Budget Support to recipient countries with high institutional 
quality. Do recipient countries with higher institutional quality receive higher amounts of 
General Budget Support, and vice versa? Departing from a policy-based discussion on aid 
effectiveness and a considerable body of research addressing the motives behind aid 
allocation, this thesis thus seeks to shed light on the role of institutional quality in relation to 
the allocation of a specific type of aid that can be seen as particularly interesting in relation to 
institutional aspects of recipient countries.  
  
Similar to many publications cited in this thesis, a quantitative, cross-country approach –
mainly Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions – is adopted. Where previous research 
mainly departs from the wide, loan-including definition of aid as ODA, the results presented 
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in this thesis are based on a dependent aid-variable comprising of flows of General Budget 
Support only. The data on General Budget Support is extracted from the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee's (OECD 
DAC) Creditor Reporting System  (CRS) database.  
 
Whilst the theoretical advantages of aid effectiveness and General Budget Support can be said 
to be recognized by the donor community in general, this thesis focuses on the General 
Budget Support provided by the European Commission financed by the member states of the 
EU within the framework of the Cotonou agreement, which provides the fundament for the 
relationship between the EU and 78 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. 
Together, the EU and its member states comprise the world's largest provider of aid. Hence, 
focusing on the EU can be seen as motivated given its leading role within the donor 
community. Furthermore, the EU can be seen as representative for the donor community 
given that the Commission, like other main donors, adhere to the principles of the Paris 
Declaration of Aid Effectiveness that emphasizes the need for allocating aid through recipient 
systems in order to enhance aid effectiveness (OECD DAC, 2005).  
 
Departing from previous research, three measures of institutional quality – control of 
corruption, rule of law and level of democracy – obtained from the Quality of Government 
dataset (Teorell et al., 2011) are used as independent variables.  
 
The results obtained indicate that the institutional quality of recipient countries does not 
determine the allocation of General Budget Support. No significant relationship between 
institutional quality and the allocation of General Budget Support is detected. This result is 
maintained when population and infant mortality are controlled for. Seen as groups, the 
countries that receive General Budget Support do not display significantly higher institutional 
quality than the countries that do not receive General Budget Support although the countries 
of the two groups all have signed the Cotonou agreement, which stipulates common allocation 
criteria for its signatories. The thesis finally seeks to analyse the results obtained in relation to 
previous research and the rationale of aid effectiveness.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
According to Alesina and Dollar (2000), the literature on foreign aid can be divided in two 
parts: one concerned with the effects of foreign aid in recipient countries and the other 
concerned with how and why donors allocate foreign aid. Although the focus of this thesis is 
on the latter, these two fields of research can be seen as interlinked. Hence, they are both 
addressed in this thesis. This chapter provides the theoretical foundation of the thesis and rests 
upon two “pillars” – one based key policy documents and evaluations of General Budget 
Support issued by major donor agencies such as the OECD DAC and the World Bank, and the 
other based on previous research and empirical findings related to aid and institutional 
quality. The theory section seeks to shed light on issues related to aid allocation and 
institutional quality in general and in relation to General Budget Support in particular. Finally, 
the section motivates why the purpose of this thesis is important from policymakers’ as well 
as from researchers’ point of view.  
 
2.1 Defining aid  
Broadly speaking, aid can be seen as all resources transferred by “donors” to “recipients” 
(Riddell, 2007). According to Riddell, the definitions, roles and motives of donors and 
recipients may vary, as well as the modalities and results achieved. The very notion of 
“foreign aid” or simply “aid” may thus imply different interpretations. It can be related to 
different contexts and political objectives, from pursuing interests of donors during the Cold 
War to the achieving of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in the 21
st
 century. Its 
origin may be traced back to the late 1940s and the implementation of the Marshall Plan 
(Bräutigam & Knack, 2004) or to the resource-flows to British and French colonies in the 
early 20
th
 century (Riddell, 2007). Thus, the notion of aid may denote different purposes as 
well as providers - from official development aid for long-term development to humanitarian 
and emergency aid to meet acute needs, provided by governmental organizations as well as 
non-governmental dittos. Riddell discusses these different connotations in terms of three 
different “aid-worlds”, where official aid is accompanied by non-official aid and humanitarian 
aid. The concept “aid” is thus complex. Recognizing the potential magnitude of the concept 
and following the discussion of Riddell, this thesis is mainly concerned with issues related to 
aid provided from “rich” official donors to “poor” recipients, with the purpose of promoting 
human welfare and reduce poverty.  
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For the sake of this thesis, measures of aid-flows will depart from Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), which is used as a measure of aid in most research on aid cited in this 
thesis (for instance Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002; Boone, 1996; 
Bräutigam, 2000; Bräutigam & Knack 2004; Charron 2011; Collier & Dollar, 2002; Djankov, 
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2008; Dollar & Levin, 2006; Dunning 2004; Ear 2007; Goldsmith 
2001; Knack, 2001; Knack 2004; Sachs et al 2004; Schraeder, Hook &Taylor 1998; 
Svensson, 1999; Wright 2009; Wright 2011).
2
 
 
The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD DAC), which can be seen as the main donor-organization, defines ODA 
as transfers of resources in the form of cash, commodities or services that have three central 
features: Firstly, each transaction has to be provided by ”official agencies, including state and 
local governments, or by their executive agencies”. Secondly, a transaction has to be 
”administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as its main objective”. Thirdly, it has to be ”concessional in character and convey a 
grant element of at least 25 per cent”. In addition, the recipient of ODA has to be on the 
OECD DAC list of ODA-recipients. Central to ODA is the notion of addressing economic 
development and welfare through the public sector of a developing country (OECD DAC, 
2008c, p. 1-4). Besides from the recipients on the DAC list, transfers to a number of 
multilateral agencies may count as ODA, including those to many United Nations agencies, 
the European Commission (EC), the European Development Fund (EDF) and various World 
Bank and IMF-agencies (OECD DAC, 2010). ODA-funds are authorized by donor 
parliaments, most commonly on an annual basis (Riddell, 2007). Over the past 50 years, 
ODA-flows have been estimated to 2.3 trillion US dollars (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008).  
 
Following this, aid is thus to be seen as ODA and “aid allocation” as the provision of aid from 
a donor to a recipient. In the context of this thesis, a donor is to be seen as a bilateral or 
multilateral provider of aid. A recipient is the country who receives aid. 
 
                                                        
2
 The academic sources cited in the thesis discuss ODA in terms of aid, development cooperation, development 
aid and foreign aid. Given that a nomenclature-based discussion is not the primary purpose of this thesis, the 
concepts of “aid” and “development aid” are mainly used due to their predominance in cited research.  
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Admittedly, ODA may be seen as an imperfect measure of aid, neglecting aid-efforts by Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and including the aid-administration of donors as well 
as the funds reaching the recipients (Riddell, 2007). However, given its predominance in 
previous research and the availability of data, ODA-based research is seen as a relevant point 
of departure for the purpose of this thesis. In turn, the aid-modality central to this thesis – 
General Budget Support – is to be seen as a specific and narrower type of ODA (OECD, 
2011a). Or put in another way: General Budget Support is ODA, but all ODA is not General 
Budget Support.  
2.2 General Budget Support 
The type of aid called Budget Support can be defined as “a method of financing a partner 
country’s budget through a transfer of resources from an external financing agency to the 
partner government’s national treasury” (OECD DAC, 2006a, p. 26). Budget Support can in 
turn be divided in the sub-categories of General Budget Support and Sector Budget Support 
(SBS), whereas the former refers to contributions to the overall budget and the latter to aid 
earmarked for discrete sectors of the budget (Koeberle & Stavreski, 2006; OECD DAC, 
2006a). Regardless the similarities between these two types of budget support, the focus of 
this thesis is mainly on General Budget Support.
3
 
General Budget Support can in turn be defined as “aid to governments that is not earmarked 
to specific projects or expenditure items” (OECD DAC, 2006b, p. 1). It is channelled through 
the recipient government’s own financial management system and is thus mixed with the 
recipient government’s own revenues. For the purpose of this thesis, General Budget Support 
is defined according to the OECD DAC CRS-database as “un-earmarked contributions to the 
government budget” (OECD, 2011c, p. 21).4 
Different donors tend to differ slightly in their definitions of Budget Support, but the notion of 
direct financial support to a country’s budget for the purpose of recipient-led poverty 
reduction is always central to the concept (Koeberle & Stavreski, 2006; Hammond, 2006). 
Budget Support can therefore be seen as a shift from “traditional” project-based development 
aid to a more effective way of providing assistance that is in line with principles of 
                                                        
3
 Some sources cited in this thesis only use the overarching concept of Budget Support (sometimes also labelled 
Direct Budget Support, DBS) and thus do not emphasize the distinction between GBS and SBS. When GBS is 
not explicitly used by a source cited, this is marked with the use of Budget Support instead of GBS.  
4
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partnership as stated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Where previous forms of 
development aid have been based on donor conditions, budget support can be seen as a new 
approach to conditionality as the conditions are jointly agreed upon before funds are 
disbursed (Williamson, 2006). Budget Support thus does not imply that the conditionality has 
disappeared completely, but rather transformed to reward “good performance” of recipients 
(Gunning, 2006). Theoretically, donors are to provide Budget Support when recipients can 
display that they live up to a number of conditions before the aid is transferred.  
Koeberle and Stavreski (2006) have identified a number of key differences between Budget 
Support and “traditional” development aid, illustrated by the figure below.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Characteristics of Budget Support compared to “traditional” development aid. 
According to OECD DAC, the notion of un-earmarked aid through government budgets 
should not be seen as a completely “new” phenomenon as it has been used before, for 
instance in the form of debt relief and structural adjustment lending. However, General 
Budget Support is seen as different from such approaches as it is designed to support 
nationally formulated – and thereby “owned” – Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS). By 
supporting strategies as such, the ownership of recipients – and thereby the effectiveness of 
aid – can be increased (OECD DAC, 2006b).  
Budget Support 
Partnership-
based 
Medium-term 
support to policy 
changes 
 Predictable 
source of 
funding 
"Traditional" 
Development Aid 
Donor-driven 
Short-term 
support to 
specific projects 
Unpredictable 
source of 
funding 
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General Budget Support can thus be seen as a way to strengthen national capacity of 
recipients and thereby ensure more efficient poverty reduction. Like World Bank-officials 
Koeberle and Stavreski (2006), an OECD-issued joint evaluation states that General Budget 
Support can be contrasted to the aid-approaches of the era of structural adjustment that 
imposed external solutions through donor-driven conditions (OECD DAC, 2006b). General 
Budget Support, with its focus on the recipients’ agenda, can therefore be seen as a 
contemporary approach to aid. Emphasizing the influence and capacity of the recipient, the 
focus on results and increased aid effectiveness, these features embody the core principles of 
the agenda for aid effectiveness.  
The function of General Budget Support in relation to the agenda of aid effectiveness is 
illustrated by the figure below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. General Budget Support in relation to the agenda of aid effectiveness. 
 
2.2.1 Who provide General Budget Support? 
OECD DAC has stated that delivering aid through recipient Public Financial Management  
(PFM) systems should be at the core of donor development strategies (OECD DAC, 2006a). 
In line with this statement, the potential of Budget Support has been recognized by many 
multilateral development organizations including various United Nations agencies, the World 
Bank and the European Commission (OECD DAC, 2006a; United Nations, 2010; European 
Commission, 2010a, b). It has also gained increased attention in the bilateral efforts of 
national governments that are pursuing the aid effectiveness agenda set out in the Paris 
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Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Hoven, 2006; Amin, 2006; NORAD, 2006; Arakawa, 
2006; Sida, 2011). 
 
Among national governments, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands 
have the largest share of General Budget Support relative other forms of development 
assistance (Strategic Partnership for Africa, 2009). In 2009, total commitments on General 
Budget Support-flows made by all donors reached almost 5 billion US dollars. Of these 
commitments, about two thirds were made by bilateral donors and one third by multilateral 
dittos (OECD 2011a).
5
 
2.2.2 Expectations, effects and experiences – rewards and risks  
The various dimensions of General Budget Support can be divided into a basic framework of 
“inputs” and “outputs”. Somewhat simplified, inputs refers to the disbursement of funds and 
outputs to the outcomes achieved (Hammond, 2006; Lawson et al., 2006). This distinction 
resembles the ditto outlined in the forthcoming section of previous research.  
Theoretically, General Budget Support is associated with a number of advantages and 
benefits. By emphasizing the recipient government’s poverty reduction-agenda and delivering 
it to the national treasury, the method is recognized to hold the potential to improve the 
quality of the recipients’ institutions, decrease the transaction costs that often are associated 
with “traditional” forms of development aid and increase the predictability of aid-flows and 
thereby facilitate recipient government budgetary planning. These features can all be 
connected to improved poverty reduction and reaching the Millennium Development Goals 
(OECD DAC, 2006a, 2012d). The ownership-dimension also enables a potential to address 
crosscutting issues in the fields of public sector reform and improvements in governance in 
recipient states. By emphasizing recipients’ priorities and enabling increased government 
spending, General Budget Support can promote recipient government accountability – to its 
taxpayers as well as to donors (OECD DAC, 2006d, Koeberle & Stavreski, 2006). The 
method is also associated with non-financial inputs, such as policy-dialogue between donors 
and recipients (Williamson, 2006). 
Although many advantages have been recognized, the effects of General Budget Support are 
seen as hard to measure given that the method can be seen as relatively new and evaluation 
                                                        
5
 2009 constant prices. Search in OECD StatExtracts-database conducted 2012-04-07. 
 10 
findings are hard to generalize. The OECD joint evaluation of the method states that the 
effects depend on the recipients’ PRS and that it can be hard to separate the effects of General 
Budget Support from the ditto of other aid-flows (OECD DAC, 2006d). 
Despite the difficulties of measuring the effects of General Budget Support, recent donor 
evaluations give support to some of its positive connotations. For instance, General Budget 
Support has been shown to allow recipient governments to increase expenditure in priority 
areas such as health and education, formulate better poverty-focused policies and perform 
better on the MDG (National Audit Office, 2008; Alonso, Judge & Kluman, 2006; Beynon & 
Dusu, 2010). It has also been associated with strengthened ownership and empowerment of 
recipient governments, increased donor alignment to recipient priorities, successful support to 
recipient PRS and improved PFM-systems (OECD DAC, 2006d; Development Information 
Services, 2006; Williamson, 2006; de Renzio, Andrews & Mills, 2010). In addition, General 
Budget Support has been associated with increased investment and growth in recipient 
countries (Lawson et al., 2006). 
Despite the positive potential and experiences of General Budget Support, a number of 
possible problems, risk and challenges have also been associated with the method. The 
OECD-issued joint evaluation concluded that General Budget Support-inflows neither had led 
to increased empowerment of the poor nor to enhanced transparency and accountability in 
recipient countries. Neither did it live up to the increased predictability of aid-flows stipulated 
in the Rome Declaration (OECD DAC, 2006d). From a policymaker point of view, the list of 
challenges continue: Putting financial resources into the national treasury of a recipient 
country with weak financial management systems can raise the risk of disbursed funds being 
misused, as it is not possible to track the use of funds disbursed (Shand, 2006). It can also 
strain the capacity of the recipient government by overemphasizing donor development 
priorities (Koeberle & Stavreski, 2006). Donors can undermine the domestic accountability of 
a recipient government if the dialogue is donor-dominated. The role of recipients in 
formulating PRS has also been recognized as weak (Williamson, 2006; Alonso et al., 2006). 
The sought-after process of strengthening recipient financial systems has also been showed to 
be slow in some cases (National Audit Office, 2008). Conversely, donors have been shown 
not to disburse amounts they previously have committed to (Strategic Partnership with Africa, 
2009).  
The jointly agreed conditions – often in the form of institutional reform – are often breached 
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due to challenges in the recipient setting, often related to violent political opposition from 
domestic interests that oppose reforms. An agreement on long-term budget support can also 
be seen as ”insurance” that allows recipients to perform poor without a cancellation of 
disbursements (Mosley & Abrar, 2006). Yet another problem is related to that recipient 
countries known for violating human rights still may display a “good” track record in areas 
that are used to assess the eligibility for budget support (Devarajan & Shah, 2006). Related to 
this line of thought is the problem is that donors who provide General Budget Support assume 
that recipient governments can be held accountable by its citizens – something that may not 
always be the case (Hauck et al., 2005). The role of General Budget Support in fostering 
democracy has also been questioned, as channelling funds to a government may not be the 
most appropriate mean to strengthening the parliament, the media and the civil society 
(Development Information Services, 2006).  
Finally, it has been argued that the focus on the recipient and the “partnership-terminology” 
associated to General Budget Support is misleading, in that it implies that power differences 
in the development context are not longer present and that the preferences of donors and 
recipients align completely, which not actually may be the case (Booth, Christiansen & de 
Renzio, 2006). 
Evidently, the experiences and implications of the usage of General Budget Support are 
mixed. Although the method is recognized to have a number of advantages in the field of aid 
effectiveness, risks and challenges related to effects as well as selection of recipients are at 
hand.  
2.2.3 Who is eligible for General Budget Support? 
For the purpose of this thesis, the eligibility-aspect of General Budget Support can be seen as 
highly interesting yet somewhat puzzling. The recipient-focused, partnership-oriented 
approach to aid effectiveness combined with the method puts the recipient’s own policies and 
institutions in focus. But is General Budget Support suitable for all recipients? Despite the 
well-established claim that General Budget Support is to be allocated to “good performers”, 
there are no commonly accepted allocation criteria that decides who receives General Budget 
Support (Koeberle & Stavreski, 2006). This is due to the fact that there is no “universal 
approach” to the method is at hand among donors – different designs are adopted in different 
countries and vary among donors and recipients. This can be motivated by arguing that the 
usage of General Budget Support thus implies more than a yes or no-question, and involves 
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many choices related to size of disbursements, risks and results-monitoring (OECD DAC, 
2006a, 2006e). 
However, recipients typically share a set of characteristics, as Budget Support mainly is seen 
as suitable for “good performers” – recipient countries with “good policy environments” 
including strong ownership, commitment and capacity to allocate disbursed resources 
effectively (Koeberle & Stavreski, 2006; Gunning, 2006). This is to ensure the efficiency of 
General Budget Support, which depends on the recipients’ capacity of managing the funds 
disbursed (Development Information Services, 2006). When deciding to provide funds 
directly to the recipient’s national budget, donors thus need to balance the benefits of the 
method against the risks it may imply (OECD DAC, 2006a).  
In order to be eligible for General Budget Support, the recipient government thus needs to 
display a will to commit to the General Budget Support-process, including an ability to 
engage with international partners and pursuing the own development-strategy. In addition, 
the recipient and the donor must reach a significant consensus on the development-strategy as 
well as a basic level of trust (OECD DAC, 2006e). Conversely, donors may not consider 
General Budget Support appropriate if the recipient government is seen as not having 
sufficient capacity to manage the funds disbursed (Development Information Services, 2006). 
The recipients of General Budget Support usually receive development aid in other forms as 
well, and all agencies that use budget support also use other aid modalities. There is thus often 
a complementarity between General Budget Support and other types of aid (OECD DAC, 
2006e). 
Despite the notion of disbursing Budget Support to “good performers” to ensure its 
effectiveness, the major OECD joint evaluation of General Budget Support concludes that 
donors apply different entry-conditions to different recipients. This pragmatic approach, with 
no fixed entry-criteria, is seen as fruitful as assessing the quality and commitments of 
recipients objectively may be very difficult. Furthermore, as General Budget Support can 
strengthen the quality of the recipients’ PFM-systems’ it may be justified to disburse it to 
“poor performers” as well (OECD DAC, 2006e). As will be evident in the following section, 
this rather positive view on the lack of fixed eligibility criteria can be seen as problematic in 
relation to previous research on aid and institutional quality. 
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2.3 Previous research 
Whereas the previous section outlined the rationale of General Budget Support departing from 
a number of donor-issued publications, this section is concerned with previous research and 
empirical findings related to aid and institutional quality. As will be evident, the potential 
risks recognized by the donor community can be motivated by empirical findings as well. 
 
2.3.1 The Effects of Aid – theoretical risks and rewards 
There is a considerable body of publications seeking to depict the effects of aid. One can – 
broadly speaking – outline two strands of theoretical suggestions, where aid is associated with 
either positive or negative outcomes. These strands can be related to Wright and Winter’s 
(2010) discussion of “aid optimists” and “aid pessimists”.  
 
On the one hand, it has been recognized that increased levels of aid is the best strategy to 
alleviate poverty in Africa, and that large, long-term aid-flows are required to achieve this. 
Following this line of thought, aid-inflows can be used to achieve a ”big push” in public 
investments, which can increase the productivity in recipient states (Sachs et al., 2004). Aid-
inflows can also be associated with increased growth, either through increased capital 
spending in recipient countries or by the fostering of growth-inducing policies (Wright & 
Winters, 2010). Furthermore, aid can be seen as a potential instrument for democratization 
through the strengthening of electoral processes, education systems, legislatures, a free press 
and civil society organizations in recipient countries (Knack, 2001; 2004). In addition, it has 
been recognized that aid-inflows may decrease corruption in recipient countries through 
conditions or through increased salaries for public employees (Tavares, 2003). 
 
On the other hand, aid can be associated with undesired features such as corruption, declining 
democracy and inefficiency. Svensson (2006) associates aid with a geographical and political 
separation between taxpayers from a donor country and the beneficiaries in a recipient 
country. This separation can lead to shortcomings in accountability, where it is difficult to 
hold anyone accountable for the management of aid-resources. It has also been recognized 
that the beneficiaries of aid – the poorest people in the world – often lack the political power 
to influence aid bureaucracies (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008). Another basic problem related to aid 
has been illustrated by Boone (1996). Following his line of thought, the role of a government 
is to finance public goods. Conversely, the government can also make non-productive 
 14 
transfers to the ruling elite. Theoretically, aid-inflows to a country can be used for both types 
of expenses, but the outcome depends on the preferences of the recipient government.  
 
According to Bräutigam & Knack (2004), an aid-recipient government may actually prefer to 
remain non-productive, given that its revenue is secured through aid-inflows regardless how it 
performs. Aid may thus imply that there is no incentive for the recipient government to 
improve its capacity. Conversely, improved conditions in a recipient country could result in 
lower inflows of foreign aid (Bräutigam, 2000). Following this, aid can be seen as an 
“unearned income”, that ultimately grants recipient leaders access to funds without needing to 
rely on tax revenues (Wright & Winters 2010). Accordingly, recipient states with large aid-
inflows do not need to collect revenue through domestic taxation. Thus, the exchange 
between taxation and the provision of effective policies and public services may not be 
established and the democratic accountability weakened. (Djankov et al., 2008; Goldsmith, 
2001; Knack, 2001; Tavares, 2003). This negative aspect of aid can be embodied by the 
concept of moral hazard (Bräutigam, 2000; Goldsmith, 2001), which in turn can be seen as a 
fundamental political and organizational problem relating to the self-interest of public 
officials, where the inefficiency of public institutions allows them to gain personally (Miller 
& Falaschetti, 2001; Miller & Hammond, 1994). 
 
According to Bräutigam and Knack (2004), aid may create incentives for recipient politicians 
and donor officials to maintain aid-flows regardless their effects. They also conclude that aid 
can undermine the access to capable staff in recipient countries, by attracting the most 
competent staff to donor-managed projects with salaries impossible to match by recipient 
governments. In addition, they conclude that when multiple donors pursue multiple donor-
administrated projects in a country, the government of the country may be cut off from the 
management of aid resources, which in turn hinders it to develop its own capacity. Large 
inflows of aid can also result in “aid dependency” – a situation where a recipient government 
cannot perform its core functions and provide its citizens with basic public services without 
foreign aid (Bräutigam, 2000).  
 
2.3.2 Institutions, aid and governance – theoretical implications 
The notion of institutions is often found in publications related to aid. This thesis departs from 
a definition of institutions being ”the rules of the game” and ”the framework within which 
human interaction takes place” as provided by North (1990, p. 3-4). This is in line with the 
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definition provided by Bräutigam (2000, p. 23), who defines institutions as ”sets of norms, 
codes of conduct, laws, and patterns of behaviour”. 
 
Following the discussion of North (1990), institutions can be formal or informal, whereas the 
former can be illustrated by formal rules, such as political and economic rules and contracts, 
and the latter by informal conventions. Created by human beings, shaped by legislators 
reflecting different interest groups and with an ability to evolve and change over time, 
institutions establish structures for human interaction and thereby contribute to determining 
the opportunities in a society. According to North (p. 33), an institutional framework consists 
of “legal rules, organizational forms, enforcement, and norms of behaviour”.   
 
According to North (1990), the institutional framework in a society in turn plays a major role 
for the economic performance by providing the structures for exchange and thereby 
determining costs of transaction. To what extent a society is able to develop effective 
enforcement of contracts is by North seen as a crucial factor for the economic performance. 
Effective judicial systems and well-specified bodies of law are examples of factors that enable 
contract enforcement. Thus they can be seen as “good” institutional features and thereby 
associated with the notion of high institutional quality. On the contrary, ambiguity of legal 
doctrines and uncertainty about agents' behaviour and insecure property rights are seen as 
negative for enforcement. These can in turn be seen as poor institutional features associated 
with low institutional quality. Following this line of argumentation, the quality of the 
institutional framework can be said to determine transaction costs, that in turn determine to 
what extent actors will engage in trade, that in turn foster wealth and development. Ideally, 
the institutional framework creates order and reduces uncertainty in exchange.  
 
The quality of institutions has been showed to play a crucial role for per-capita income-levels 
and economic performance (Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004). Institutions may be 
measured different ways, but are often conceptualized in terms of growth fostering – for 
instance as protection against government expropriation, property rights and constraints on 
the incumbent (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001). Institutions are to be seen as 
somewhat context-specific, with origins in historical circumstances, geography, political 
economy and other initial conditions. Despite this, institutions in different contexts can 
embody the same economic and political core principles (Rodrik et al., 2004). 
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North (1990) associates “good” institutional aspects to “developed countries” and their 
opposite to “Third World countries” (p. 59). Poor institutional frameworks – that is, low 
institutional quality – in the latter, leads to higher transaction costs than in the former 
category. This is in line with the argumentation of Knack (2001), according to which 
institutional quality can be seen as a necessity for developing countries. Knack states that 
institutions that establish a predictable, impartial, and consistently enforced set of rules for 
investors are crucial for achieving economic growth – and thereby poverty reduction – in 
developing countries. According to Knack, such institutions can be encompassed by the 
concept ”good governance”. The discussions provided by North and Knack thereby establish 
the relationship between institutions and development in a country, which is central for the 
purpose of this thesis. High institutional quality is thus associated with development, and vice 
versa.  
 
Furthermore, not only does institutional quality play a role for the level of development in a 
country. Institutional characteristics as such are widely recognized as determinants of the 
impact of aid (Dollar & Levin, 2006) as well as the allocation of aid (Bräutigam, 2000).  
 
The notion of institutional quality can in be seen as related to the concept of governance, 
which in turn has been recognized as difficult to define but can be associated with the 
impartiality of government institutions (Rothstein & Theorell, 2005). In relation to aid, 
Bräutigam (2000) associates governance with features such as increased transparency, greater 
domestic ownership of policies and programs, fiscal management and accountability. 
Problems related to governance include deficient official information, weak mechanisms of 
accountability, weakly enforced rule of law and ineffective bureaucracies (Bräutigam & 
Knack, 2004). According to Bräutigam and Knack, poor governance – including weak 
institutions and high levels of corruption – is a characteristic feature of many developing 
countries that receives aid. Aid can affect the institutional quality in recipient states, but the 
institutional quality in a recipient country also can affect how much aid a country gets, as 
outlined by Bräutigam (2000). 
 
Institutions related to growth are often discussed in terms of transparency, openness to trade 
and property rights and rules and behaviours that implement them (Kaufmann, Kray & 
Mastruzzi, 2010). There are quantitative measures of institutional quality of countries in line 
with these aspects. For instance, a number of publications cited in this thesis (Alesina & 
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Weder 2002; Dollar & Levin 2006; Easterly & Pfutze 2008; Bräutigam & Knack 2006; 
Tavares 2003) depart from an index provided by the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), that quantifies measures of Corruption, Bureaucratic Quality and Law and Order 
(Teorell et al., 2011). How institutional quality will be measured for the sake of this thesis is 
further outlined in the methods-section. 
 
2.3.3 Aid and institutions – mixed empirical evidence 
There is a considerable empirical body on previous cross-country research depicting the 
relationship between aid and recipient institutions. However, this research does not depict a 
unanimous tendency. The findings of Goldsmith (2001) suggest that aid-inflows do not 
undermine the quality of recipient institutions. Rather, his results indicate that aid-inflows are 
associated with higher levels of political and civil liberty in Africa. Dunning (2004) has 
showed a positive relationship between and aid and levels of democracy in the post-Cold War 
era. Results presented by Tavares (2003) suggest that inflows of foreign aid may decrease 
corruption
64 
in recipient countries.  
 
Conversely, it has been shown that high levels of aid may erode the quality of recipient 
political institutions in terms of bureaucratic quality, corruption and the rule of law 
(Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Knack, 2001) and democracy (Djankov et al., 2008). The 
findings of Bräutigam (2000) indicate that this negative association may be stronger in 
countries where aid comprises a large share of the Gross National Product (GNP). In addition, 
Boone (1996) provides evidence that aid inflows rather benefits ruling elites and increases the 
size of government than improve the conditions for the poorest in recipient countries. 
Furthermore, the findings of Knack (2004) indicate that aid-inflows do not promote 
democracy.  
 
Aid-inflows have thus been recognized to be positively and negatively associated with the 
institutional quality of recipient countries by different researchers. It has been recognized that 
the somewhat contradicting results depicted above may depend on different approaches to 
data and methodology (Wright, 2009). The role of data in relation to the mixed results of aid-
                                                        
6
 The notion of ”corruption” is in this thesis to be seen as ”the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain” as put out in Kaufmann et al (2010, p. 4). 
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related research has also been discussed and demonstrated by Easterly, Levine and Roodman 
(2004). Furthermore, Alesina and Dollar (2000) underline that the negative findings can be 
discussed as a “hen or egg”-problem: Does a negative association between aid-inflows and 
institutional decline imply that aid is at the core of the problem or that aid is directed to assist 
recipients with their problems?  
 
Several publications have indicated that the outcomes of aid depend on the institutional 
quality in recipient countries: According to Wright (2009), foreign aid can foster or hinder 
democratization depending on authoritarian incumbents’ perceived likelihood of getting 
access to aid funds after democratization. Ear (2007) concludes that aid has the potential to 
contribute to improvements and decreased quality of recipient institutions, as aid-inflows are 
shown to be associated with improvements in some governance indicators but decreases in 
others. This is in line with Rodrik (1996) who states that aid can help “bad” governments as 
well as “good” ones to survive and Easterly and Pfutze (2008) who conclude that bad 
governments make aid less effective.  
 
Aid has been shown to have a positive impact on growth in settings where the recipient 
displays a “good policy environment” that fosters growth (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). The 
association between aid and growth has also been showed to depend on recipients’ level of 
democracy (Svensson, 1999). Stating that aid recipients operate in different institutional 
settings – that in turn fosters different behaviours – Wright and Winters (2010) conclude that 
there is no simple conclusion on the relationship between aid and economic growth. On the 
one hand, aid inflows could foster economic growth. On the other, it could provide cover for 
recipient governments to keep insufficient economic policies and political institutions.  
 
The extent to which aid may contribute to corruption has been showed to depend on the 
existing institutions in recipient countries and the timeframes available to spend resources 
(Wright, 2008, 2010). Consistent with these findings, Wright and Winters (2010) conclude 
that the political institutions of an aid-recipient country determine how aid resources are 
spent. In turn, these institutions may or may not facilitate positive outcomes of aid. Bräutigam 
(2000) concludes that the effects of aid depend on the institutions in recipient countries. 
Following her argument, aid can be used well if the recipient has strong institutions and vice 
versa. The “problem” is thus not aid per se but rather poor institutions, which often are 
present in developing countries. Consistently, aid can be seen as a double-edged sword, which 
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can be used to improve as well as aggravate the institutions in recipient countries (Bräutigam 
& Knack, 2004). 
 
2.3.4 The allocation of aid – the determining factors 
Various researchers have recognized the potential problems of aid in relation to institutional 
quality and the fostering of unsound incentives. In order to overcome the potential risks of 
aid-inflows and decreasing quality of recipient institutions, it has been recognized that aid 
needs to be delivered in ways that promote “good governance” and removes the incentives for 
poor governance in recipient countries. This is also said to make aid-resources used more 
effectively (Bräutigam, 2000). To achieve this, it has been argued that ”well-governed” 
countries with committed governments and sound policies should be offered increased levels 
of aid (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Collier & Dollar, 2002; Sachs et 
al., 2004). This is said to create incentives for good performance rather than its opposite. 
Bräutigam and Knack have also concluded that aid needs to be designed to support the 
recipient government instead of pursuing the donor’s agenda in order to make it more 
effective. This notion of allocating aid to recipients with “good” institutions has been labelled 
”institutional selectivity”, which means that aid is channelled to countries that ”have the 
institutional and policy framework to use the resources effectively” (Dollar & Levin, 2006 p. 
2036).  
Which factors then determine how aid is allocated? Are donors practising the principle of 
allocating aid to “good” recipients as often stated? Theoretically, the answer to this may not 
be unanimously positive. It has previously been argued that aid-flows reflect the interests of 
donors rather than the needs of recipients (Boone 1996). Recipient needs can be seen as one 
of several factors that determine who receives aid (Wright & Winters, 2010). Maizels and 
Nissanke (1984) outline two broad and interlinked motivations for donors to disburse aid: to 
assist development in recipient countries and to promote their own interests. According to 
Schraeder et al (1998), aid may be allocated based on strategic interests of nation states, 
humanitarian needs in recipient countries or by the capitalist motives of ruling elites in 
recipient and donor countries. These three bases for allocation respond to the overarching 
paradigms of realism, idealism and neo-Marxism. Riddell (2007) outlines an aid-setting 
where the motives of poverty eradication, emergency-relief and the promotion of 
development, growth and human rights – often cited by official donors – are accompanied by 
a less outspoken pursuit of donor national, political and commercial interests and the fostering 
 20 
of historical ties. Several other scholars have recognized this “hidden” dimension of aid: 
Svensson (2006) discusses foreign aid as a means of donors to influence policies and 
outcomes in another sovereign state. Alesina and Dollar (2000) conclude that aid allocation 
based on political and strategic interests of donors may “reward” corrupt and non-democratic 
recipients with “bad” policies and institutions, and thus reduce the likelihood for positive 
outcomes. Following their line of thought, aid allocation based on strategic interests may 
conflict with the often acclaimed general principles of foreign aid as a means to reduce 
poverty. Although often associated with industrialized and democratic donors (Schraeder et al 
1998), it is important to underline is that aid is not to be seen as a solely “western” 
phenomenon. For instance, the Soviet Union and China have also used aid to pursue political 
objectives (Wright 2009; Wright & Winters 2010). 
 
Several studies have confirmed the presence of donor interests in aid allocation. It has been 
showed that donors disbursed aid based on strategic and geopolitical considerations rather 
than on the level of democracy in the recipient countries during the Cold War (Dunning, 
2004) even if Cold War-components may have diminished in present time (Wright & Winters, 
2010).  
 
Svensson (1999) has showed that while the disbursements from a few bilateral donors are 
associated with measures of democracy in recipient countries, donors in general do not 
allocate more aid to democratic countries. This may indicate that strategic and political 
motives – rather than the promotion of democracy – are prioritized by donors while providing 
aid. Results presented by Alesina and Weder (2002) indicate that donors in general do not 
discriminate corrupt governments from “good performers” when allocating aid. Their results 
also indicate that high levels of aid correlate with high levels of corruption in recipient 
countries. Donors have also been showed to allocate aid based on voting patterns in the 
United Nations General Assembly (Andersen, Hansen & Markussen, 2006) and on 
membership in the UN Security Council. (Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland, 2009; Kuziemko & 
Werker, 2006). 
 
The findings of Alesina and Dollar (2000) indicate that strategic and political considerations 
of donors – rather than the policies and institutional quality of recipients – determine who 
receives foreign aid, although recipients who democratize may receive larger aid-inflows. 
They also show that bilateral donors allocate twice as much aid to a non-democratic former 
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colony than to a democratic non-colony. Accordingly, the allocation of aid based on colonial 
relations and voting patterns in the UN rather on institutional performance is seen as a hinder 
to achieve aid effectiveness. This is in line with the results presented by Collier and Dollar 
(2002), indicating that aid allocation is based on strategic and historical reasons and due to 
this often is directed to weak policy environments which in turn decreases the likelihood of 
poverty reduction. The findings of Neumayer (2003) indicate that far from all bilateral donors 
allocate more aid to recipients that respect human rights, although donors generally claim the 
opposite. Easterly and Pfutze (2008) conclude that although different donor agencies allocate 
aid based on different criteria, a lot of aid goes to corrupt countries and other countries than 
those that display the highest levels of poverty. This is in line with the findings of Schraeder 
et al (1998), who indicate that bilateral donors allocate aid based on strategic interest, 
economic self-interest and ideological similarities. They conclude that different donors 
allocate aid based on different considerations, and that the notion of foreign aid as an altruistic 
instrument as often claimed by donors needs to be rejected. The presence of donor interest can 
also be illustrated by Riddell’s (2007) finding that the poorest countries receive less than half 
of total ODA-flows. 
 
One way for donors to pursue their interests is to attach policy conditions to the aid they 
provide. According to Wright and Winters (2008) the goal of conditionality is to encourage 
recipient governments to undertake economic, political or institutional reform. White and 
Morrissey (1997) have stated that donor objectives for applying conditionality may depend on 
the context. Furthermore, they state that ex post-conditionality – meaning that previous 
performance of recipients are used to determine their eligibility – is more effective than ex 
ante-conditionality, which in turn is based on agreed future goals. The Monterrey Consensus 
and the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness (PDAE) can be seen as ways of donors to 
frame conditionality in terms of donors “helping” recipients decide which reforms are most 
suitable (Wright & Winters 2010).  
 
There may also be a difference between bilateral and multilateral donors when it comes to aid 
allocation: Burnside and Dollar (2000), conclude that multilateral donors do allocate more aid 
to countries with “good policies” but that this does not hold for bilateral donors. Charron 
(2011) has also showed that aid provided by multilateral donors is associated with lower level 
of corruption in recipient countries, whilst this does not hold for bilateral donors. 
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Theoretically, bilateral aid allocation may be based on colonial relations and geopolitical 
interest to a greater extent, while multilateral donors may be less affected by factors as such. 
Multilateral aid-flows have therefore been recognized to have a higher potential to reward 
“good performers” and penalize corruption (Alesina & Weder, 2002). The findings of Dollar 
and Levin (2006) indicate that multilateral aid is significantly associated with “good 
institutions” in recipient countries, embodied by democracy and rule of law. Due to this, 
multilateral aid is therefore labelled more ”selective” than bilateral aid. The selectivity of 
donors is shown to have increased since the Cold War, mainly in terms of economic 
institutions. Dollar and Levin also show that bilateral donors tend to allocate aid to former 
colonies and countries in their own neighbourhoods. Multilateral donor-agencies have also 
been shown to be more sensitive towards the needs of recipients and less sensitive in terms of 
donor interest (Neumayer, 2003).  
 
Following these results obtained by previous research, examining the determining factors for 
the allocation of General Budget Support can be seen as motivated. 
 
2.3.5 Mixed implications of aid and institutions – a brief summary 
As illustrated in this section, there are general issues related to aid. On the “output”-side, the 
effects of aid may be related to risks as well as benefits. Evidence presented in previous 
research is somewhat mixed. The effects of aid have been widely recognized to depend on the 
institutions in recipient countries. On the “input”-side, aid has been recognized to be more 
effective if allocated to recipients with “good” institutions. However, empirical evidence 
shows that donors do not only allocate aid based on the performance and needs of the 
recipients – their own interests may also influence the allocation.  
 
The sources cited in this section outline what can be described as a clash where donors’ 
selectivity in favour of good performers can imply increased effectiveness, but also may 
contradict with their strategic interests, that in turn often has been described as determinants 
of aid allocation. Nevertheless, as outlined in the previous section, the rewarding of ‘good 
performers’ has gained increased attention from the donor-community over the past decade.  
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2.4 Outlining the research problem  
As previous sections have outlined, there is a well-established debate of general issues related 
to aid and recipient institutions outlined by previous research as well as policy-documents and 
evaluations issued by main donor organizations. These two sources of publications commonly 
recognize benefits and risks associated to aid on an overarching level. Previous research 
typically departs from quantitative aid-variables based on the overarching concept of Official 
Development Assistance, whilst the World Bank and the OECD relies on qualitative 
approaches to a greater extent when examining the specific features of General Budget 
Support. This approach is intimately connected to the partnership-oriented agenda of aid 
effectiveness as outlined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which puts recipients' 
priorities and systems in the centre of aid efforts.  
The rationale of allocating General Budget Support to “good recipients” is well in line with 
the previously cited research that states that the impact of aid depends on the quality of 
recipient institutions (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Svensson, 1999; Wright 2008; Wright, 2010; 
Wright & Winters, 2010; Bräutigam, 2000). In the context of General Budget Support, this 
line of thought can be extended to also include the input of aid: General Budget Support is 
seen as suitable for recipient countries with sufficient institutional quality (Koeberle &  
Stavreski, 2006).  
Yet, the experiences of General Budget Support are mixed, and most evaluations depart from 
single cases. Institutional quality should determine allocation, but no fixed eligibility criteria 
are at hand. Despite the risks of corruption and misuse of aid resources, donors hold that it 
may be justified to allocate General Budget Support to recipients with weak institutional 
quality as well, as this may improve their institutions (OECD DAC, 2006e). Given this 
somewhat contradicting allocation aspect, how do donors allocate General Budget Support in 
practice?  
Central to the problem formulation of this thesis is what may be referred to as a “double 
nature” of General Budget Support: It is labelled un-earmarked and connected to the concept 
of partnership but in practice donors decide about disbursements and influence the recipients’ 
policies. It can strengthen the recipients’ institutions but can at the same time weaken 
domestic accountability if allocated to “poor performers” with weak institutional quality, 
which may imply risks in the form of corruption. It is seen as more suitable for “good 
performers” with sufficient capacity to live up to agreed strategies and thus ensure aid 
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effectiveness but can also improve conditions in “bad” recipient countries. Furthermore, no 
fixed eligibility criteria exist, which can qualify “poor performers”, but recipients with weak 
institutions may increase the risk for the misuse of funds provided.  
Given its absence in previous research and its focus on the recipients, combined with the 
potential risks of aid-inflows distorting domestic accountability and fostering incentives for 
corruption in recipient countries, General Budget Support can be seen as highly interesting in 
relation to previous aid-related research.  
Who receive General Budget Support? Does the institutional quality of recipients’ of General 
Budget Support determine the allocation of funds as donors’ claim that it should? As the 
existing evaluations of the method to a large extent are based on single cases, an overarching 
cross-country tendency is hard to outline. Does the quality of recipient institutions determine 
the allocation despite the lack of fixed eligibility criteria? A considerable body of previous 
research presented in previous research (Alesina and Weder 2002; Boone 1996; Maizels & 
Nissanke, 1984; Schraeder et al, 1998; Riddell 2007; Svensson, 1999; Svensson, 2006; 
Dunning, 2004; Andersen et al, 2006; Dreher et al, 2006) indicates that donors may not only 
allocate aid based on the performance and needs of recipients, but also may let allocation be 
influenced by their own interests. However, the conclusions of this research are almost in 
every case based on aid measured as ODA. Few (if any) quantitative cross-country 
approaches seem to depart from aid measured as General Budget Support, with the work of 
Beynon and Dusu (2010), presented in an “informal discussion paper” issued by the European 
Commission, as one rare exception.  
By departing from General Budget Support, this thesis may therefore contribute to an 
extended knowledge of aid allocation, relevant for previous research as well as for the policy-
based debate on aid effectiveness. Is the tendency of aid allocation based on donor interest 
still to be found when the concept of aid is “narrowed” from ODA to General Budget 
Support? Or is General Budget Support, as has been claimed, first and foremost allocated to 
recipient countries with good institutions, as suggested by central donor-agencies? Or simply 
put: To what extent are disbursements of General Budget Support associated with the 
institutional quality of recipient countries? The aim of this thesis is to further investigate this. 
This formulation of research problem is based upon two core recognitions. First, a main part 
of previous cross-country research on development aid is based on the broad definition of 
development aid as ODA. Secondly, previous donor-issued evaluations of General Budget 
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Support are based on single country-experiences and rather focus on the “output”-side of the 
method than on the “input”-side. This thesis seeks to bridge these two gaps, by focusing 
solely on the “input”-side of General Budget Support in a quantitative cross-country study. 
The approach of this thesis can therefore be seen as relevant in relation to previous research as 
well as to the recent policy-debate on aid effectiveness. 
2.4.1 Purpose and research question  
The general purpose of this thesis is to investigate to what extent donors allocate General 
Budget Support to recipient countries with high institutional quality. This formulation of 
purpose departs from a theoretical foundation derived from previous research, suggesting that 
donors may not allocate aid primarily based on recipient needs and performance, whilst the 
institutional quality of recipient countries is associated with the outcomes of aid.  
The answering of the following research question will fulfil this purpose:  
Does the institutional quality of recipient countries determine the allocation of General 
Budget Support?
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3. Research design, method and variables 
3.1 Research Design 
As the research question of this thesis seeks to investigate the association between General 
Budget Support and institutional quality among different recipient countries, a cross-sectional 
design will be adopted. This design is associated with the investigation of multiple research-
units at a single point in time with quantitative data (Bryman, 2008). The research question 
will be answered through statistical analyses of numbered variables. This approach responds 
the notion of quantitative research design as defined by Creswell (2009) and is predominantly 
adopted in the research cited in the theory-section of this thesis.  
 
According to Bryman (2008) quantitative research may be associated with a deductive 
relationship between theory and research and the notion of a measurable objective reality. 
This can be contrasted to qualitative research, which in turn may be associated with the 
generation of theories and the notion of a constructed reality that can be interpreted in 
different ways. Following the line of thought presented by Creswell (2009), a quantitative 
design can, at a glance, be contrasted to a qualitative ditto. Whereas the former can be 
associated with statistical analysis and numerical measures, the latter can be associated with 
interpretations on how individuals and groups understand problems and concepts. According 
to Creswell, these two approaches are not to be seen as absolute opposites but rather as 
complementary. This notion is acknowledged throughout this thesis. Deriving from it, the 
approach of a case study – by Creswell mainly associated with qualitative research – will 
influence this thesis. According to Creswell, a case study implies that the research is focused 
on one or several specific entities. By selecting one donor – that thus will represent the “case” 
in this thesis – the allocation of General Budget Support can be compared to legislation to a 
greater extent that would have been possible if several donors with different allocation 
policies had been chosen. Given that different providers of General Budget Support – bilateral 
and multilateral – may depart from different policies and legislations, a study examining the 
allocation of General Budget Support from all donors to all recipients would have been hard 
to conduct. The design of this thesis is a comparative study of recipient countries that have 
signed the Cotonou agreement with the European Union (EU).  
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3.2 Selection of Case: The European Commission 
This thesis departs from the European Union, and its executive body the European 
Commission (henceforth the Commission), as provider of General Budget Support. Starting to 
disburse aid in the form of Budget Support in 2001, it was one of the first donor agencies that 
implemented the approach (Hauck, Hasse & Koppensteiner, 2005). The Commission is 
responsible for proposing and enforcing legislation in the Union’s member states, 
implementing EU-policies and allocate EU-funds (European Commission, 2012a). General 
Budget Support allocated by the Commission is thus funded by the EU Member States. 
The Commission provides greater volumes of ODA than main multilateral organizations such 
as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (OECD DAC, 2007). In 
2009, the total ODA provided by the EU and its Member States amounted to €49 billion 
(European Commission, 2010a). The often stated claim that the EU and its member states 
together comprise “world’s largest donor” (European Commission, 2012b) can further 
motivate why its executive body can be seen as a critical and relevant case for this thesis. 
Theoretically, aid provided by the European Commission could be seen as representative for 
the donor community given that the Commission – just like other main donors (bilateral as 
well as multilateral) – are members of the OECD DAC and adhere to the principles of the 
Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness that emphasizes the need for allocating aid through 
recipient systems in order to enhance aid effectiveness. It is therefore likely that the 
Commission's policies on aid allocation and General Budget Support are similar to other 
donor organisations ditto. It is therefore plausible that the results obtained by this thesis may 
be applicable to other donors as well. 
 
The selection of the Commission can also be motivated by the focus on recipient priorities 
found in central development-policy documents of the EU. The European Consensus on 
Development (ECD), jointly agreed by representatives of the governments of the Member 
States and the main EU organizational bodies
7
 in 2005, sets out poverty eradication through 
sustainable development and the achieving of the MDGs as the key objective of the EU 
development policy. In the ECD, poverty is defined as a multi-dimensional concept which 
core comprises of the deprivation of economic, human, political and protective capabilities of 
humans. The notion of development is also related to good governance, human rights and 
                                                        
7
 The Council of Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament. 
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various political, economic, social and environmental aspects.  It is also stated that the 
development-efforts – in the form of partnerships and dialogue – carried out by the EU and its 
member states will ”promote respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, 
democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice”. 
According to the ECD, EU-aid is to be allocated based on “standard, objective and 
transparent” criteria. These criteria should address the needs as well as performance of 
recipients (Official Journal of the European Union, 2006, paragraphs 1, 5, 7, 13-15, 23, 25-26, 
64-66). The ECD is thus heavily influenced by the core principles of the Paris Declaration, as 
the ownership of “partner countries” is stressed as important and the responsibility for 
development efforts is to be seen as mutual. Furthermore, it states that aid efforts are to be 
increased and improved through boosted aid-flows and reduced transaction costs. The 
Commission has also recognized the importance roles governance and recipient institutions 
for successful aid-effects to be achieved, and states that this recognition is at the core of EU 
development strategies (European Commission, 2012e). 
 
Recognizing the potential failure of reaching all Millennium Development Goals, the 
Commission has recently underlined that EU-development efforts need to be up-scaled, 
recognizing that the jointly agreed target on allocating 0,7 % of total Gross National Income 
(GNI) to ODA by 2015 may not be achieved (European Commission, 2010a). Regardless the 
call for increased aid-flows, these alone are not seen as sufficient to achieve the MDGs. 
Aligning with the publications cited in the theoretical section of this thesis, the Commission 
therefore stresses the importance of recipients’ institutions as it states that the use of recipient 
strategies and systems – in particular PFM-systems – through Budget Support is seen as an 
overarching principle of these increased development efforts, as it may increase the 
ownership and state legitimacy of the recipients. 
Following this, the European Commission can be seen as a relevant and up-to-date “vessel” of 
the policy-principles of aid effectiveness and allocation based on “good“ recipient institutions 
outlined in the previous parts of the thesis.  
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3.2.1 General Budget Support provided by the European Commission  
Departing from the Paris Declaration, the ECD (paragraph 26) states that the use of General 
Budget Support should increase ”where circumstances permit” in order to increase aid 
effectiveness.
8
 Over the period of 2003-2009, Budget Support (Sector and General) 
commitments comprised over 13 billion Euros or about 25 % of all aid commitments made by 
the Commission. Budget Support-commitments as a share of total aid commitments were 
during this period highest in the ACP-countries
9
 with a total of 56 % (European Commission, 
2012f). In the context of the Commission, Budget Support is not solely referring to the 
transfer of financial resources. Rather, it should be seen as a “package including policy 
dialogue, performance assessment, capacity-building and other supporting interventions” 
(European Commission, 2010b, p. 6).  
 
The Commission’s view on General Budget Support mainly responds to the positive 
connotations as outlined in the previous section. Benefits for recipients as well as donors are 
recognized: The accountability of the recipient’s national parliament is expected to strengthen 
when its ability to carry out essential functions related to welfare provision to its citizens 
increases. Furthermore, the use of Budget Support is by the Commission seen as a way to 
alleviate poverty through reducing the number of donor-driven projects (harmonisation), 
emphasizing the priorities of the recipient (alignment) and strengthen its PFM-systems 
(capacity building) (European Commission, 2008a). On the donor-side, Budget Support is 
seen as the “best instrument for encouraging our partner countries to implement their 
strategies to reduce poverty” (ibid., p. 18) It is also seen as way for donors to “promote good 
governance by supporting the partner country’s institutions” (ibid.). This choice of vocabulary 
corresponds to North's (1990) definition of institutions as well as the theoretical foundation 
suggesting that aid can improve the institutional quality in recipient countries. 
 
Does then the Commission allocate General Budget Support to recipients with high 
institutional quality? As the Commission took part of the OECD DAC joint evaluation of 
General Budget Support cited in the previous section, it is aware of the potential risks 
                                                        
8
 Important to underline is that the ECD also outlines several other aid modalities, including project aid and 
humanitarian assistance. As these modalities are outside the scope of this thesis, they will not be further 
discussed in relation to the European Commission. 
9
 ACP-countries refers to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. 
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associated to the method (European Commission, 2007). The allocation of General Budget 
Support is mainly discussed in terms of economic measures and performance of the recipients 
(European Commission, 2008a, p. 33): A recipient’s PFM-system needs to be “suﬃciently 
transparent, reliable and eﬀective” and its macroeconomic policies need to be “positively 
assessed”. The Commission (2008a) has outlined three distinct eligibility criteria for Budget 
Support, namely “a well-deﬁned national or sectoral policy and strategy; a stability-oriented 
macroeconomic policy; and a credible and relevant programme to improve public ﬁnance 
management” (ibid. p. 40). The Commission (2012f) is keen to underline that Budget Support 
only is disbursed to recipients that meet three eligibility criteria. When the criteria are not met, 
Budget Support is not to be disbursed. However, the Commission also openly states that it has 
no minimum criteria for disbursements. If the policy of the recipient is “relevant” and 
“credible”, Budget Support is seen as a suitable method (ibid., p. 49-50). For the purpose of 
this thesis, this claim is highly interesting. In addition to the criteria for General Budget 
Support, the Commission also stresses the need for democracy, human rights and governance 
in recipient countries if EU aid is to be allocated (2008a).  
 
Despite the claim that the General Budget Support only is provided to countries that meet the 
criteria (European Commission, 2012f), the Commission has been criticized for its way of 
disbursing GBS. The external investigatory audit agency of the EU – the European Court of 
Auditors (2011) – has also criticized the Commission not managing the risks associated with 
the method appropriately and for not even having a sufficient method to do this. This is 
associated with shortcomings in eligibility-assessments, where the Commission is criticized 
for using a dynamic interpretation of the eligibility criteria. The Court of Auditors has 
therefore concluded that weak institutional performance, in the form of PFM-systems and 
development-oriented policies, may not hinder the Commission from disbursing General 
Budget Support. This is illustrated by the claim that General Budget Support – despite the 
eligibility criteria – sometimes is allocated to recipients with weak PFM and corruption. In 
addition, the Commission has been criticized for not displaying clear explanations on how 
allocations of General Budget Support are made and for not adjusting the General Budget 
Support programmes to the specific circumstances of the each recipient country.  
 
The use of General Budget Support in the context of the Commission may therefore not be 
seen as unproblematic. The dynamic interpretation of eligibility criteria recognized by the 
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Court of Auditors and the absence of democracy-related aspects in the three main eligibility 
criteria further motivates why it is a relevant point of departure for this thesis. 
3.2.2 Selection of recipients: the Cotonou agreement 
The development-efforts of the EU as carried out by the European Commission ranges to a 
wide list of recipient countries all over the world (European Commission, 2012j). However, 
the ECD emphasizes that increased aid-efforts especially are required in Africa in order to 
achieve the MDGs (Official Journal of the European Union, 2006). Several of the sources 
cited in the theory-section of this thesis also explicitly depart from African countries (e.g. 
Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Dunning, 2004; Goldsmith 2001; Schrader et al, 2008). Other 
previously cited publications typically also include African countries even when the recipient-
list is more extensive (e.g. Djankov et al, 2008; Dollar & Levin, 2006; Knack 2004). Given 
the presence of the continent in previous research and the policy-documents of the 
Commission, the data upon which this builds will depart from an Africa-sample. The data will 
also include a number of Pacific and Caribbean states – namely, the signatories covered by 
the Cotonou Agreement.  
The Cotonou agreement is the framework for the EU’s relations with 78 countries from 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (henceforth ACP-countries).
10
 This agreement – by the 
Commission labelled “the most comprehensive partnership agreement between developing 
countries and the EU” – has the main objective is to reduce and ultimately eliminate poverty 
(European Commission, 2012i). This objective is to be achieved through development-
cooperation, economic and trade cooperation and political dialogue. The Cotonou agreement 
was signed in 2000 and entered into force in 2003, but builds on a long tradition of relations 
between the EU and the ACP-countries. A tradition that – according to the Commission – is 
based on partnership, mutual interests and interdependence (European Commission, 2012d). 
The Cotonou agreement thus builds on the previous contractual agreements between the EU 
and the ACP countries of the 20
th
 century (the Lomé conventions), which have emphasized 
aid, trade and political aspects in the cooperation between the parties.   
Article 61.2 of the Cotonou agreement (Official Journal of the European Union, 2000) 
outlines the provision of Budget Support to ACP-countries. It is stated that it shall be granted 
where “(a) public expenditure management is sufficiently transparent, accountable and 
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effective; (b) well defined macroeconomic or sectoral policies established by the country 
itself and agreed to by its main donors are in place; and (c) public procurement is open and 
transparent.” These formulations were valid during the year of disbursement of focus for this 
thesis – 2008. 
The Cotonou agreement, along with the ECD, thus provides a common policy for the 
Commission's allocation of Budget Support to the signatories among the ACP-countries. It is 
therefore a relevant point of departure when selecting recipients to examine. Given the its 
outspoken ambition to allocate General Budget Support to “good” recipients, if an association 
between allocation and institutional quality is not found in the case of the Commission, it may 
not be found elsewhere either.  
3.3 Method 
A quantitative method has been chosen to address the research question, mainly by 
conducting Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. OLS implies that numbered variables 
are fitted into a linear model, where the sum of squared residuals (the difference between 
actual and predicted values) is as low as possible.  For the sake of this thesis, a variable is 
defined as “a characteristic or attribute of an individual or an organization that can be 
measured or observed” (Creswell 2009, p 50). OLS thus estimates parameters of linear 
models, where it is possible to examine the association between independent x-variables and 
dependent y-variables (Hamilton, 1992) and the extent to which the x-variables determine the 
y-variable. The association between the variables will also be examined through correlation 
analyses. The correlation indicates the relationship between two variables and theoretically 
stretches from -1 to +1.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, a dependent variable based on allocation of General Budget 
Support will be constructed and examined in relation to a numbers of independent variables 
measuring institutional quality in recipient countries.
11
 As a first step, bivariate correlation 
analyses will compare the variables two at a time. This can shed light on the extent to which 
the dependent and independent variables correlate (Hamilton, 1992). The bivariate analysis 
will be followed by bivariate and multivariate regression analyses, the latter with all 
independent variables and control variables included. This will allow for conclusions to be 
drawn on the extent to which institutional quality determines the allocation of General Budget 
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Support. Following the line of thought presented by Hamilton, the insertion of the control 
variables may allow a check for spuriousness, the extent to which possible relationships 
between the independent and dependent variables is a result from their relation with other 
variables. 
 
The use of OLS regressions is intended to investigate the extent to which institutional quality 
determines the allocation of General Budget Support. Important to underline is that the causal 
relationships between the variables can be further discussed. Bearing the “hen or egg”-
discussion provided by Alesina and Dollar (2000) in mind, the difficulties of addressing 
causality in relation to aid and institutions are acknowledged. Perhaps needless to say, it is not 
likely that an absolute causality between General Budget Support allocation and institutional 
quality exists. Factors such as budgetary restrictions of donors would not allow for unlimited 
allocation, no matter how high institutional quality a recipient display.  
 
The results from the regressions will be used to answer the research question. A positive 
significant relationship between GBS-allocation and institutional quality may indicate that 
“good” recipients are favoured, whereas the opposite (or a lack of correlation) could imply a 
negative answer to the research question.  
 
The choice of OLS regressions as method can not least be seen motivated as it is widely used 
in the previous research on aid and institutions as previously cited
12
 (Acemoglu et al, 2001; 
Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Bräutigam, 2000; Collier & Dollar, 
2002; Djankov et al 2008; Dreher et al, 2009; Ear, 2007; Easterly et al 2004; Knack, 2001; 
Rajan & Subramanian, 2007; Sachs et al, 2004; Wright, 2007; Svensson 1999). The method is 
therefore seen as relevant for the purpose of this thesis.  
 
3.3.1 The dependent variable: General Budget Support 
Previous research concerned with aid and institutional quality cited in this thesis departs from 
similar, yet sometimes different measures of the concepts of interest for this thesis. As stated 
in the theory-section, aid is predominantly measured as ODA. The previous research on aid 
and institutions cited in this thesis nevertheless departs from aid-variables that may vary 
slightly. Some use ODA as a share of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in recipient countries 
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 Some of these authors use other types of regressions in combination with OLS. 
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(e.g. Collier & Dollar, 2002; Djankov et al, 2008; Svensson 1999), others ODA as a share of 
Gross National Products  (GNP) (e.g. Boone, 1996; Bräutigam, 2000; Dunning, 2004; 
Goldsmith, 2001; Knack, 2004) and yet others depart from ODA as a share of Gross National 
Income (GNI) (e.g. Wright, 2007). Aid-variables have also been constructed on a “donor-
basis”, where ODA from different donors are compared (e.g. Alesina & Dollar, 2000) In 
addition, some publications depart from other aid-data than ODA-measures (e.g. Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000; Easterly et al 2004; Neumayer, 2003). The various “aid-variables” have in turn 
been used as either dependent or independent in different publications.  
 
Inspired by the approach of Alesina and Weder (2002), this thesis will use its aid variable – 
allocation of General Budget Support – as the dependent variable. This variable will be based 
on data on the Commission's commitments of General Budget Support extracted from the 
OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activities database.
13
 This database builds on 
official data reported to the OECD DAC by its members, and divides aid flows into the two 
sub-categories allocated and disbursed. The data is processed and controlled by the OECD 
DAC secretariat (OECD DAC, 2012e). The choice to depart from commitments of General 
Budget Support rather than disbursements can be motivated by Anderson et al (2006). 
According to them, commitments are fully controlled by the donor, whereas disbursements 
partly rely on recipient behaviour. The use of commitments thus reflects the initial intention 
of the donor to a greater extent than would have been the case if disbursements would have 
been used. The variable is coded so that low inflows of General Budget Support correspond to 
a low value, and vice versa.
14
 
Figures on General Budget Support will be based on commitments made for the year 2008. 
This is motivated by two factors: It is after the adoption of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the European Consensus on Development, and allocations was highest this 
year compared to other years of the past decade with available data. The year of focus thus 
corresponds to a policy-environment heavily influenced by the focus on the recipient in order 
to enhance aid effectiveness.  
3.3.2 Independent variables 
The notion of institutional quality has been conceptualized and measured in different ways in 
                                                        
13
 Available online at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW (2012-04-29). 
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 See Appendix B. 
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previous research.  According to Bryman (2008), the use of multiple indicators of a concept 
can make a study more accurate. The overarching notion of institutional quality can thus be 
illustrated by different indicators. Therefore, three indicators of institutional quality will be 
used as independent variables for the sake of this thesis. These measures are all possible to 
relate to the discussion on institutions provided by North (1990). 
 
Sources cited in this thesis depart from different datasets and variables addressing institutional 
quality and governance. A number of publications depart from data which focuses on 
bureaucratic quality, rule of law, and corruption provided by a commercial service called the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (Alesina & Weder 2002; Bräutigam, 2000; 
Bräutigam & Knack 2004; Charron, 2009; Dollar & Levin, 2006; Knack, 2001; Tavares 
2003).  Bräutigam and Knack has identified the ICRG data as particularly suitable in relation 
to aid-related research. However, the commercial nature of this dataset, as well as the lack of 
coverage of the ICRG-variable in the freely available QoG-dataset, contributed to the decision 
to not depart from the ICRG-data in this thesis.
15
 
 
Rather, this thesis will depart from the World Bank's World Governance Indicators (WGI)  
when it comes to independent variables. The WGI are based on perceptions and consist of six 
aggregate measures that address voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence or terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption (Kauffmann et al, 2010). These six dimensions of governance have 
been recognized as relevant in relation to aid (Ear, 2007). The WGI are used in publications 
by Rodrik and Trebbi (2001), Sachs (2004) and Ear and can thus be seen as relevant in 
relation to previous research in the field of aid and institutions. 
 
In line with the eligibility criteria for General Budget Support outlined in the Cotonou 
agreement, the  discussion on institutions provided by North (1990) and the previous research 
outlined in the previous section, the WGI measures ”Rule of Law” and ”Control of 
Corruption” will be deployed. The Quality of Government dataset provided by Teorell et al 
(2011) will serve as the source for the WGI-measures.  
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 More info to be found at https://www.prsgroup.com/prsgroup_shoppingcart/pc-66-3-countrydata.aspx (2012-
04-29). 
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Important to underline is that the six dimensions of governance of which the WGI consists are 
not to be seen as independent of each other. As stated by Kauffmann et al (2010), it is likely 
that the dimensions are positively correlated across countries and that it may not be possible 
to divide the overarching notion of governance into clear-cut individual measures. 
In addition, an independent variable addressing the level of democracy in recipient countries  
will be included. This variable is based on the democracy index of Freedom House and is 
consistent with the approaches of Alesina and Dollar, (2000) Dollar and Levin (2006), 
Goldsmith (2001), Neumayer (2003) Svensson (1999). The democracy-variable is also 
extracted from the Quality of Government-dataset (Teorell et al., 2011). 
The three independent variables used address rule of law, corruption and level of democracy. 
Following the discussion of Dollar and Levin (2006), the WGI-variables can be seen as 
addressing economic institutions whereas the Freedom House-variable can be associated with 
political institutions. The independent variables used will be lagged, meaning that they will be 
covering years before 2008. This will allow for an analysis that addresses the extent to which 
the institutional quality at a previous point in time actually determines the allocation of 
General Budget Support.
16
  
 
3.3.3 Control Variables 
A control variable is a variable that may influence the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables (Sundell, 2012). The inclusion of control variables in a regression 
analysis thus allows for more justified conclusions to be drawn. For the purpose of this thesis, 
the control variables are based on possible other determinants of aid allocation as recognized 
by previous research.  
Following the argumentation of Boone (1996), the population of recipient countries will be 
used as a control variable.  According to his argument, countries with smaller populations 
may have relatively more influence “for sale” than more populous countries. Following this 
rationale, countries with smaller populations are likely to receive relatively larger amounts of 
aid. This argument is supported by the findings by Alesina and Dollar (2000), who conclude 
that small countries get more aid per capita. A variable measuring population, taken from the 
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QoG-dataset, potentially addressing the notion of donor strategic interest, will therefore be 
included consistent with the approaches by Boone and Alesina and Dollar. 
In addition, a control variable addressing poverty will be included. According to Boone 
(1996), infant mortality is one of the best indicators of poverty. Countries with high infant 
mortality are in more need of foreign aid (Neumayer, 2003). According to Ear (2007), infant 
mortality can be seen as a basis for aid allocation regardless of the institutional quality in 
recipient states. Infant mortality will therefore be used as control variable. The variable will 
be lagged, in line with the approach adopted by Knack (2001).  
Following the argumentation of Ear (2007) these two control variables can be said to address 
recipient needs as well as donor interest in relation to the allocation of General Budget 
Support. The use of them can also be motivated by Knack (2001) who states that population 
and infant mortality, along with per capita income, can be seen as the most significant 
predictors of aid. The two control variables will also be taken from the Quality of 
Government dataset (Teorell et al, 2011). 
3.3.4 Discussion on shortcomings, analytical power and generalizability   
The main motivation for the quantitative approach chosen for the purpose of this thesis is its 
presence in previous research on aid and institutional quality, combined with the lack of 
quantitative research that addresses General Budget Support specifically. The quantitative 
approach of this thesis can also be contrasted to many of the donor issued publications on 
General Budget Support, which predominantly departs from qualitative approaches, and 
thereby be seen as a complement to their conclusions. Thus, this thesis can hopefully bridge 
the gap between previous quantitative research concerned with ODA (but not General Budget 
Support) and donor-issued evaluations concerned with qualitative evaluations of General 
Budget Support.  
 
Nevertheless, it is recognized that a qualitative approach also could have been adopted for the 
purpose of this thesis. A plausible alternative qualitative design and method could have been 
to compare one recipient country with very high inflows of General Budget Support to a 
recipient country with very low inflows and investigate to what extent the difference in 
allocation could be associated with the initial institutional quality of the two recipients.  
Interviews and text analyses, rather than regressions, could have been used for this approach. 
However, this approach would have made it hard to compare the results to previous findings 
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based on quantitative studies. On the other hand, following the discussion outlined by Bryman 
(2008), a qualitative approach could have shed light on how various actors in the aid-context 
interpret institutional aspects related to General Budget Support. 
 
Quantitative research as carried out by social scientists can be criticized on a number of 
grounds. Following Bryman's (2008) discussion, it may be accused of treating data as static 
and constant rather than constructed and interpreted, even if the latter description may be 
more accurate. Furthermore, quantitative research can be seen as overly optimistic when it 
comes to the belief in measures and their accuracy. From a “qualitative point of view”, the 
concepts and measures adopted in quantitative research may be thus seen as constructed 
rather than definite. Taking into account this potential criticism, the approach of thesis is can 
be seen as imperfect yet sufficient and relevant in relation to previous research and to its 
purpose. The data and variables used in this thesis are not chosen because they are the only 
existing measures of the concepts of interest, but because they are well established in the 
context of previous research as well as in the relevant policy setting. 
 
According to Hamilton (1992) OLS regressions can be said to have many advantages when 
certain conditions are fulfilled and be seen as the best linear unbiased estimator. For this to be 
hold, a number of conditions need to be fulfilled. For instance, measurement errors have to 
have constant variance and have to be uncorrelated with each other. Ideally, neither the 
independent x-variables nor the standard errors should be correlated with each other. 
However, ultimate conditions for OLS as such are rarely found in practice. Important to 
underline is also the concept of omitted variables – variables that may affect the dependent as 
well as the independent variables and thereby make true estimations about the relationships 
misleading. Recognizing these risks, diagnostic tools and re-coding are used in order to 
overcome potential risks as such.
17
 
 
Following the discussion of Bryman (2008), departing from well-known and established 
sources can ensure high quality of data. Furthermore, it can make this study repeatable and 
thereby implies high reliability. The operationalization of institutional measures in this thesis 
corresponds to previous research, which can be seen to imply what may be referred to as 
validity. It is acknowledged that the usage of official sources – such as the OECD – does not 
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guarantee that the data is perfect. As Bryman (2008) has stated, all datasets may suffer from 
problems related to lack of data and shortcomings in collection procedures. For the sake of 
this thesis, it is therefore acknowledged that all social measurement is prone to errors that in 
turn can be minimized. In order to do so, the OLS guidelines by Hamilton (1992) have been 
adopted.  
 
Important to underline is finally that the operationalization of institutional quality also could 
have been made differently. Following the discussion provided by (Creswell 2009), the extent 
to which the independent variables affect the dependent can be related to the question of 
internal validity. Given that omitted variables also may influence the outcome, this cannot be 
absolutely guaranteed. The usage of well-established control variables can hopefully serve as 
a means to ensure a sufficient degree of internal validity. As of external validity – or the 
extent to which the findings of this study may be generalized – the Commission adhere to the 
same principles of the Paris Declaration as many other major donors. This could make the 
results of this study relevant in relation to other donors who disburse Budget Support and 
adhere to the same overarching policy principles of aid effectiveness and ownership, and 
thereby contribute to the analytical power of the thesis.  
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4. Results and analysis 
 
Are there then any significant relationships between institutional quality and the allocation of 
General Budget Support? A correlation analysis does not display any significant relationships 
between the variables.
18
 The lack of significant correlation between institutional quality and 
the allocation of General Budget Support is further illustrated by the subsequent scatter plots.  
 
Table 1. Correlations between variables 
Variable GBS as 
share of 
GDP 
Control of 
Corruption 
Rule of 
Law 
Democracy Population 
(ln) 
Infant 
Mortality 
 
GBS as share of 
GDP 
 
 
 
-0,123 
 
-0,179 
 
-0,101 
 
0,271* 
 
0,452** 
 
Control of 
Corruption 
 
-0,123 
 
 
 
0,842** 
 
0,603** 
 
-0,513** 
 
-0,657** 
 
Rule of Law 
 
-0,179 
 
0,842** 
 
 
 
0,718** 
 
-0,593** 
 
-0,720** 
 
Democracy 
 
-0,101 
 
0,603** 
 
0,718** 
  
-0,556** 
 
-0,645** 
 
Population (ln) 
 
0,271* 
 
-0,513** 
 
-0,593** 
 
-0,556** 
  
0,719** 
 
Infant Mortality  
 
0,452** 
 
-0,657** 
 
-0,720** 
 
-0,645** 
 
0,719** 
 
1 
*** = p <0.001 ** = p <0.01 * p <0.05 
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Figure 3. Scatter plot illustrating the relationship between the allocation of General Budget 
Support and Rule of Law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Scatter plot illustrating the relationship between the allocation of General Budget 
Support and Control of Corruption. 
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Figure 5. Scatter plot illustrating the relationship between the allocation of General Budget 
Support and Democracy. 
 
 
The tendency discerned in the correlation analysis and depicted by the scatter plots is 
maintained when the results from the bivariate and multivariate regressions are summarized in 
the following two regression tables.
19
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 43 
Table 2. Results from bivariate regressions. Dependent variable: General Budget 
Support as share of GDP. Unstandardized b-coefficients, standard errors within 
parentheses. 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Control of Corruption 
 
 
Rule of Law 
 
 
Democracy 
 
 
 
Intercept 
 
 
N 
 
R² (adjusted) 
 
 
-0,003 
(0,003) 
 
-0,004 
(0,002) 
 
-0,001 
(0,001) 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
*** = p <0.001 ** = p <0.01 * p <0.05 Sources: OECD, 2011a; United Nations 
Statistics Division, 2012; Teorell et al., 2011. 
 
As depicted in the table above, the bivariate regressions did not display significant 
relationships between the variables, indicating that none of the three measures of institutional 
quality used determine the allocation of General Budget Support.  
 
The lack of significant association between General Budget Support and control of corruption 
can be associated with risks related to moral hazard. The allocation of un-earmarked aid 
directly to a recipient government’s national treasury may well be misused if the government 
is corrupt (Bräutigam, 2000; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Djankov et al., 2008; Goldsmith, 
2001; Knack, 2001; Tavares, 2003). Furthermore, this can be seen as conflicting with the 
claim that General Budget Support is to be allocated to “good performers”. The same goes for 
the lack of significant relationship with the variable measuring rule of law.  
 
Recalling the discussion provided by North (1990), the allocation of General Budget Support 
to recipient countries that cannot upheld the rule of law, including the protection civil liberties 
and an independent judiciary, can be seen as associated with higher transaction costs and 
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thereby less development than would have been the case if a positive significant relationship 
would have been detected. Seen from this wider institutional perspective, this result indicates 
that General Budget Support may not be allocated in a way that maximizes the impact of aid. 
This is in line with the notion that the impact of aid depend on the quality of recipient 
institutions (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Ear, 2007; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008; Wright, 2009) the 
results from the bivariate analyses are not overly optimistic. 
  
The lack of significant association between allocation of General Budget Support and the 
level of democracy in recipient countries is similar to the finding of Svensson (1999). 
Following his argument, this result can be seen as aligned with his claim that strategic and 
political motives determine the allocation aid to a greater extent than the promotion of 
democracy. The lack of association with democracy could perhaps be seen as problematic in 
relation to the EU policy claim that respect for democracy and human rights is at the core of 
its development efforts (Official Journal of the European Union, 2006).  
 
The lack of significant relationships is maintained in the multivariate regressions conducted. 
Model 1 refers to the bivariate regressions with the independent variables included one at a 
time as depicted in the previous table, model 2 to a regression with all three independent 
variables included simultaneously and model 3 to a regression that also includes the two 
control variables.  
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Table 3. Results from multivariate regressions. Dependent variable: General Budget Support 
as share of GDP. Unstandardized b-coefficients, standard errors within parentheses. 
 
Variable Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Control of 
Corruption 
 
Rule of Law 
 
 
Democracy 
 
 
Population (ln) 
 
 
Infant mortality 
 
 
Intercept 
 
 
N 
 
R² (adjusted) 
 
 
-0,003 
(0,003) 
 
-0,004 
(0,002) 
 
-0,001 
(0,001) 
 
0,002* 
(0,001) 
 
0,000*** 
(0,000) 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0,003 
(0,005) 
 
-0,007 
(0,005) 
 
0,001 
(0,001) 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
0,004 
(0,008) 
 
75 
 
-0,002 
 
0,005 
(0,005) 
 
0,001 
(0,005) 
 
0,002 
(0,001) 
 
(0,000) 
(0,001) 
 
0,000*** 
(0,000)*** 
 
-0,020 
(0,018) 
 
73 
 
0,249 
*** = p <0.001 ** = p <0.01 * p <0.05 Sources: OECD, 2011a; United Nations 
Statistics Division, 2012; Teorell et al., 2011. 
 
 
The multivariate regression thus does not display significant relationships between the 
variables, further indicating that the independent variables not are to be seen as determinants 
of the dependent variable. That is, the results obtained do not suggest that the various 
dimensions of institutional quality conceptualized by the independent variables influence the 
allocation of General Budget Support. Recognizing the potential role of the shortcomings of 
the data outlined in Appendix B, this result does not give support to the notion that 
institutional quality determines the allocation of General Budget Support. 
 
The only significant regression coefficient in the multivariate regression is displayed for 
infant mortality, suggesting that the level of poverty in recipient countries does not matter for 
the allocation of General Budget Support.  
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In order to examine if recipients of General Budget Support display higher institutional 
quality than non-recipients, a comparison of the mean-scores of the independent variables 
between the two groups was made, followed by a t-test addressing the level of significance.
20
 
The results obtained indicate that there are no significant differences between the Cotonou-
signatories that receive GBS and the ones that do not in terms of institutional quality. The 
(non-significant) means displayed by the non-recipients were generally higher than for the 
recipients, which could be seen as interesting.  
 
4.1 Conclusion and discussion 
At this time, it might be appropriate to revisit the research question posed earlier and answer 
it based on the results achieved. Does the institutional quality of recipient countries determine 
the allocation of General Budget Support? The findings of this thesis indicate that the 
institutional quality of recipient countries does not determine the allocation of General Budget 
Support. None of the institutional features from which other publications cited in this thesis 
have departed – control of corruption, rule of law and level of democracy – were significantly 
associated with the allocation of General Budget Support. The result was maintained when the 
control variables – level of poverty and population – were controlled for. A comparison of 
means between the recipients and non-recipients did not display any significant differences 
among the groups in terms of institutional quality.  
 
The Conclusion of this thesis can thus be summarized as follows: There is no evidence that 
donors do allocate General Budget Support based on the institutional quality of recipient 
countries. The purpose of this thesis – to examine to what extent donors allocate General 
Budget Support to recipient countries with high institutional quality – can therefore be seen as 
fulfilled. 
 
How are then the results obtained to be interpreted? Implications can be discerned in relation 
to previous research, theoretical claims by the main donor institutions and not least EU 
development policy. 
 
In relation to previous research, the results could be interpreted as aligned with the theoretical 
framework associated with strategic, rather than altruistic, allocation of aid (Alesina and 
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 See Appendix C 
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Weder 2002; Boone 1996; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Schraeder et al, 1998; Riddell 2007; 
Svensson, 1999; Svensson, 2006; Dunning, 2004; Andersen et al, 2006; Dreher et al, 2006). 
However, important to underline is that the results presented in this thesis do not allow for 
any conclusions to be drawn on the actual motives behind such allocation in the context of 
General Budget Support.  
 
Theoretically, General Budget Support is associated with increased aid effectiveness as it can 
enable recipient governments to pursue their own policies and thereby improve their own 
capacity and institutions (OECD DAC, 2006e). The results presented in this thesis does not 
indicate that General Budget Support is allocated to the recipients that display the highest 
institutional quality, indicating that all theoretical benefits of the method may not be fully 
realized. The fact that no relationship between institutional quality and General Budget 
Support could be detected may be seen as contradicting the donor claim that the aid modality 
is allocated to “good” recipients. This could in turn implicate that General Budget Support 
does not imply increased aid effectiveness. Following from this, it would perhaps not be 
unjustified for donors to downplay the claim that General Budget Support only is allocated to 
recipients with high institutional quality.  
 
It is also plausible that inflows of General Budget Support to recipients with weak 
institutional quality may be associated with a greater risk for moral hazard (Bräutigam 2000; 
Goldsmith 2001) and removed incentives for recipient governments to increase their capacity 
(Miller & Falaschetti, 2001; Miller & Hammond, 1994; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Wright & 
Winters 2010; Djankov et al 2008; Goldsmith, 2001; Knack 2001; Tavares 2003) compared to 
inflows to recipients that display higher levels of institutional quality. Following this line of 
thought, the results obtained may be seen as problematic.  
 
However, it is important to underline that no time aspect has been included in this study. 
Hence, no far-reaching conclusions can be drawn about the institutional quality in the 
recipient countries over time. It is plausible, yet outside the scope of this thesis, that the 
institutional quality of the recipients examined in this may have improved over time. This 
question could very well be addressed by further research.  
 
The conclusion of this thesis may be seen as problematic in relation to the notion of 
institutions of recipients as determinants to aid effectiveness. It could also be seen as 
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problematic that ODA-resources with the explicit aim to support ”good” recipients is not 
allocated based on institutional quality, when donors claim that this should be the case. If un-
earmarked financial resources originating from tax-payers in donor countries will continue to 
be allocated to recipients without clear criteria, it could perhaps be an idea for the donor 
community to either consider introducing fixed eligibility criteria or to downplay the claim 
that General Budget Support is allocated to “good recipients” that respect democracy and 
display low levels of corruption.  
 
For the case of the European Commission, the results do not explicitly contradict the existing 
policy on General Budget Support. However, the lack of significant relationships between 
allocation and institutional quality could be seen as problematic in relation to the policy claim 
that levels of democracy, human rights and governance in recipient countries needs to be 
satisfactory if Budget Support is to be allocated (European Commission, 2008a). From a 
donor point of view, the recipients of General Budget Support must have been considered 
eligible in some aspect. The lack of clear criteria makes it hard to follow the justification of 
the method – not least given the lack of significant differences between the recipients and the 
non-recipients.  
 
Admittedly, the lack of significant relationship between institutional quality and allocation of 
General Budget Support may be seen as ”acceptable” from a policy based point of departure, 
given the notion of non-fixed eligibility criteria (Koeberle & Stavreski, 2006) as a way to 
enable institutional improvements in poor performing recipient countries.  
 
Do donors then practice what they preach when allocating General Budget Support? In terms 
of allocating it to “good performers”, the answer would be negative. However, as illustrated 
by this thesis, the main problem may not be that donors no not practise what they preach – 
rather, that they are preaching two contradicting principles of allocation of General Budget 
Support at the same time: to allocate it to recipients with high institutional quality but that it 
may be justified to allocate it to poor performers as well in order to improve their institutional 
quality. This may have implications in terms of decreased aid effectiveness as well as donor 
credibility. 
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4.2 Directions for future research 
This thesis has been addressing issues related to aid allocation and institutions by narrowing 
the standard definition of aid, ODA. Similar points of departure could contribute to shed light 
on the “input” as well as “output” side of General Budget Support. The results presented in 
this thesis would probably benefit from a further analysis in relations to the impact of General 
Budget Support, analysed over time. Do the institutions of recipient countries improve over 
time when General Budget Support is allocated? Does the method contribute to poverty 
reduction? Given that this thesis indicates that one of the main arguments in favour of General 
Budget Support as quoted by the main donor organizations – that it is allocated to recipients 
with good institutions – may not hold, the other main argument – that General Budget Support 
improves recipient institutions and that no fixed allocation criteria therefore are needed – 
could fruitfully be addressed.  
 
A comparison between General Budget Support and “standard” ODA would also help to shed 
light over the presumed characteristics of the method. Furthermore: Do the results of this 
thesis hold when General Budget Support provided by other donors to other recipients is 
analysed? These questions could be addressed by quantitative as well as qualitative research 
designs. Aid allocation based on donor interest rather than institutional quality is likely to 
increase the risk of moral hazard, especially in the case of un-earmarked aid.  
If aid effectiveness through increased focus on recipient institutions is to be further pursued 
by donors and recipients, empirical evidence in favour of the policy-based rationale of 
General Budget Support can be seen as necessary – not least in order to keep aid effectiveness 
and aid recklessness separated. 
 
4.3 Epilogue 
During the finalization of this thesis, on May 14
th
 2012 the development ministers of the EU 
adopted so called Council Conclusions stipulating new guidelines for General Budget Support 
– “The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries” (Council of the European 
Union, 2012). This can be seen as an evidence of the relevance of the point of departure of 
this thesis.  
 
The Council Conclusions reaffirms the Union's commitment to the method, but underlines 
that human rights, democracy and fight against corruption need to be further emphasized. It is 
stated that General Budget Support ”shall only be provided when and where it is assessed that 
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there is trust that it (...) will be spent in accordance with shared objectives and values, in 
particular human rights, democracy and the rule of law (…)” (Council of the European Union, 
2012, p. 2 paragraph 8). In fact, the very name of General Budget Support is modified into 
”Good Governance and Development Contracts”. Furthermore, it is stated that “transparency 
and budget oversight will become an additional eligibility criterion” (ibid., p. 3, paragraph 
14).  
 
At a glance, and following the results presented in this thesis, these statements could be seen 
as motivated if the Union seeks to realize the full potential of General Budget Support and 
avoid providing it to dubious regimes. But is this “future approach” to General Budget 
Support then to be interpreted as a shift towards stricter eligibility criteria? The answer to this 
may not be given, as the Council Conclusions also state that “in all forms of budget support 
the EU will apply a tailor-made and dynamic approach to eligibility (...)” (Council of the 
European Union, 2012, p. 2, paragraph 6).  Nevertheless, these Council Conclusions could 
provide a fruitful point of departure for future research in the field of General Budget Support.
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Appendix A 
 
The 78 African, Pacific and Caribbean countries that have signed the Cotonou 
agreement 
Angola 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Belize 
Cape Verde 
Comoros 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Congo (Brazzaville)  
Congo (Kinshasa) 
Cook Islands 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Republic of Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Equatorial Guinea 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
 
 
 
Malawi 
Mali 
Marshall Islands  
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Micronesia 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nauru 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Niue 
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
Rwanda 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Solomon Islands 
Samoa 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Timor Leste 
Togo  
Tonga 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Vanuatu 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe
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Appendix B 
Description of the variables  
Dependent variable 
General Budget Support as share of Gross Domestic Product 2008 (GBSofGDP) 
Data on GBS-allocation was extracted from the OECD DAC's Country Reporting System 
(CRS) database and the OECD.STAT browser.
21
 
 
GBS data was extracted from the database using the following criteria: 
Donor: ”EU-institutions” 
Sector: VI:1. ”510, General Budget Support, total” 
Recipient: [country of choice] 
Year: 2008 (The year 2008 was chosen because it is relatively recent and GBS-allocation was 
highest this year compared to the other years of available data). 
GBS is expressed in constant prices (USD 2009).
18
 
 
Data on GDP for the countries that receive GBS was taken from the United Nations Statistics 
Division's (UNSTAT) National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. GDP is expressed in 
constant prices (USD 2005).
22
 
 
Independent variables 
The independent variables are extracted from the Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et 
al., 2011.). SPSS diagnostics showed the independent variables to be normally distributed. 
Higher scores correspond to better outcomes and thereby higher institutional quality.  
 
Rule of Law (qog_wbgi_rle) 
Cross-section, 2002-2006 (varies by country).  
Based on the World Bank's 'Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), more info available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. 
 
Definition from the QoG codebook (p. 70): ”“Rule of Law” includes several indicators which 
measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. 
These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success 
of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis 
for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected.” 
 
Control of Corruption (qog_wbgi_cce) 
Cross-section, 2002-2008 (varies by country) 
Based on the World Bank's 'Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).
23
  
 
                                                        
21
 The browser can be accessed at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,2340,en_2649_34447_37679488_1_1_1_1,00.html (2012-05-17). 
22
 The data is available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp (2012-05-17). 
 
23
 More info available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (2012-05-17). 
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Definition from the QoG codebook (p. 70): “Control of Corruption” measures perceptions of 
corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The 
particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging 
from the frequency of “additional payments to get things done”, to the effects of corruption on 
the business environment, to measuring “grand corruption” in the political arena or in the 
tendency of elite forms to engage in “state capture”.  
 
Democracy (qog_fh_ipolity2) 
Cross-section: 2002-2006 (varies by country) 
Based on data from Freedom House, more information available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
Description from the QoG codebook (p. 46): ”Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least 
democratic and 10 most democratic. (...) Imputed values for countries where data on Polity is 
missing by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure.” 
 
Control Variables 
Extracted from the QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 2011). 
 
Population (ln_qog_wdi_pop) 
Based on the World Bank's World Development Indicators. 
(Cross-section: 2002-2004 (varies by country). The original variable was log-transformed due 
to skewness.  
Description from the QoG codebook (p. 158): ”The de facto definition of population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship, except for refugees not 
permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the 
population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates.”  
 
Infant mortality (qog_wdi_mort) 
Cross-section: 2000-2002 (varies by country). 
Description from the QoG codebook (p. 177): ”Infant mortality rate is the number of infants 
dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year.” 
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T-test variable: Recipient of GBS (GBSrecipient) 
Constructed so that 1 = No GBS, 2 = GBS recipient 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Illustration of GBS-recipients in relation to non-recipients among the signatories of 
the Cotonou agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Summary of variables 
Variable N mean std. dev. min max 
  
GBS/GDP 
  
78 
  
0,0081 
  
0,01669 
  
0,00 
  
0,07 
  
Control of Corruption 
  
75 
  
-0,4241 
  
0,67703 
  
-1,70 
  
1,44 
  
Rule of Law 
  
76 
  
-0,4187 
  
0,82480 
  
-1,95 
  
1,75 
  
Democracy 
  
76 
  
6,4404 
  
2,76893 
  
1,00 
  
10,00 
  
Population (ln) 
  
74 
  
14,5089 
  
2,15407 
  
9,90 
  
18,69 
Infant Mortality  
  
  
74 
  
67,7814 
  
39,37695 
  
5,70 
  
151,11 
  
Recipient of GBS 
(yes/no) 
  
74 
  
  
1,269 
  
0,4464 
  
1,00 
  
2,00 
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Multicollinearity 
 
The independent variables were tested for multicollinearity, which means that two or more of 
the variables are correlated with each other (Hamilton, 1992). If the independent variables are 
correlated to a too high extent, it may not be possible to discern the separate effects on the 
dependent variable. The correlations illustrated in table 5 indicate that the independent 
variables are significantly correlated. This may be seen problematic yet acceptable, given that 
they have been chosen to represent the overarching notion of institutional quality. In line with 
the results obtained from the regressions, no significant correlations are displayed between 
GBS as a share of GDP and the independent variables. It can also be noted that there is a 
positive correlation between GBS as a share of GDP and the control variables. 
 
 
Heteroscedasticity and distribution of errors 
 
According to Hamilton (1992), heteroscedasticity may lead to inefficiency and biased 
standard error estimates. Heteroscedasticity implies that the errors may not have constant 
variance. For the dependent variable, the residuals are plotted against the predicted values 
below. Figure 7 on the next page indicates that the residuals may vary more when predicted 
allocation of General Budget Support is high. It also indicates that errors may not be normally 
distributed. The data used may have shortcomings in relation to the use of OLS regressions. 
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It was discovered that the variable based on the original values was somewhat skewed, 
meaning non-normally distributed and not ideal for regressions. In order to overcome this, 
logarithmic transformation of the variable was conducted. Given that many of the countries 
did not receive any General Budget Support, many of the values for this variable were zero. 
The value zero has no logarithmic value. Therefore, following the recommendations outlined 
in Hamilton (1992) and Osborne (2002), the constant 1.00 were added to the original value to 
move the minimal value to 1.00. The transformed variable was also slightly skewed. 
Therefore, the original variable was kept, as it was seen as corresponding with previous 
research to a greater extent than the transformed variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Predicted values plotted against residuals for the dependent variable. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 5. Comparison of means of institutional quality between recipients and non-recipients 
of GBS.
24
 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Recipient of 
GBS 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Rule of Law - Estimate 
No GBS 55 -,3384 ,89908 ,12123 
GBS recipient 21 -,6290 ,55168 ,12039 
Control of Corruption - 
Estimate 
No GBS 54 -,3591 ,71903 ,09785 
GBS recipient 21 -,5913 ,53403 ,11654 
Democracy (Freedom 
House/Imputed Polity) 
No GBS 55 6,4404 3,00988 ,40585 
GBS recipient 21 6,4404 2,07145 ,45203 
                                                        
24
 A t-test showed the differences between the groups to be insignificant. 
